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INTRODUCTION
The governance of forests and their resources has always been a
contentious issue. It has created a divide between developing and de-
veloped countries, as well as within them.1 With the increasing
recognition of forests as valuable commodities in the global market, the
management of forests in developing countries is becoming a matter of
constant concern for ecologists, economists, and politicians.
The 1992 Earth Summit stressed the need to sustainably use
and manage forests for the wellbeing of present and future genera-
tions.2 After more than a decade of negotiations, the “Non-Legally
Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests” (NLBI)3 was adopted as a
landmark instrument in 2007. The instrument brought global consen-
sus for Sustainable Forest Management (SFM). NLBI aims to
influence forest governance through “international cooperation and na-
tional action to reduce deforestation, prevent forest degradation,
promote sustainable livelihoods and reduce poverty for all forest-de-
pendent peoples.”4 Intense negotiations at the Earth Summit followed
by drafting of Forest Principles5 and Agenda 216 provided a launching
pad for the national action plans for SFM. The political pressure due to
international climate change negotiations, loss of assets in the form of
1. See Annie Petsonk, Legal Obligation and Institutions of Developing Countries:
Rethinking Approaches to Forest Governance, in WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW VOLUME 3:
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBAL LEGAL GOVERNANCE 293 (Hassane
Cisse et al. eds., 2012), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/
Resources/WBLegalReviewVol3.pdf.
2. See generally United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Earth
Summit), Rio de Janiero, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/ Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (August 12, 1992) available
at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm [hereinafter Earth
Summit]; U.N. Conference on Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), Stockholm,
June 5th-16th, 1972, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, available at http://www.un-documents
.net/aconf48-14r1.pdf  [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
3. United Nations Forum on Forests, Rep. of its 7th Sess., Feb. 24, 2006, and Apr. 16-
Apr. 27, 2007, E/CN.18/2007/8, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/349/31/
PDF/N0734931.pdf?OpenElement.
4. About UNFF, U.N. FORUM ON FORESTS, http://www.un.org/esa/forests/about.html
(last visited Sept. 5, 2014).
5. See generally U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Non-Legally
Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/
26 (Vol III), Annex III (August 14, 1992), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/
conf151/aconf15126-3annex3.htm [hereinafter NLBI].
6. See generally United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Agenda 21, ¶11.1 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992),
available at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf.
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timber and other ecosystem services, and drastic environmental imbal-
ances have also compelled developing countries to use innovative legal,
institutional, and public engagement approaches for the management
of these vast resources.
Despite this restructuring of forest governance approaches by
many countries, its implementation suffers from various flaws. For in-
stance, the rule of law has not been internalized by society or
government officials. Thus, much of the international debate on for-
estry, like NLBI, has emphasized mainstreaming “co-management”
and recognized the legitimate role of local communities and forest-
dwellers in the decision-making processes that affect forests.7
Part I of this article provides an overview of the Participatory
Forest Management (PFM) approach in the international context. Part
II and III examine environmental governance in the forest sector of
two rapidly emerging economies of the world, India and Brazil. Part IV
analyzes the two regimes and proposes adoption of favorable practices
from one another to supplement their PFM framework through policy
recommendations. The discourse focuses on the development of par-
ticipatory tools for forest governance, pinpointing the key legal
instruments, executive actions, institutional arrangements, and public
engagement initiatives in the context of the historical, political, and
economic backdrop of both countries. The fundamental role of the state
and judiciary in inducing regulatory and behavioral coherence among
the key actors has been discussed in the light of accountability and
transparency by way of background and analysis. The article concludes
with recommendations to mitigate existing and future conflicts in the
successful implementation of a PFM regime in India.
I. PARTICIPATORY FOREST MANAGEMENT: CHANGING THE NATURE
OF RESOURCE OWNERSHIP
Forests are categorized as a “common-pool resource,”8 and from
time immemorial, forest resources have been central to the lives of
many forest-fringe communities and ancient tribes. Approximately
10% of the total forest area worldwide is governed and managed by
local communities.9 After the nonbinding agreement on Forest Princi-
7. See NLBI, supra note 5, principle 2(c).
8. Thorkil Casse & Anders Milhøj, Community Forestry and Forest Conservation:
Friends or Strangers?, 21 ENVTL. POL’Y & GOVERNANCE 83, 84 (2011) (citing Nimai Das,
Incidence of Forest Income on Reduction of Inequality: Evidence from Forest Dependent
Households in Milieu of Joint Forest Management, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1617 (2010)).
9. Id. at 87.
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ples, many developing countries have committed to include local
communities, forest dwellers, women, and indigenous people in the
“development, planning and implementation of the national forest poli-
cies.”10 PFM is one of the mechanisms that seek to meet the dual
objectives of forest conservation and shifting traditional rights over for-
est resources to the forest dependent communities.
PFM essentially refers to co-management of forests by sharing
responsibilities and benefits in the process. This is one of the recog-
nized approaches to the sustainable development of “all types of forests
and to strengthen long-term political commitment to this end . . . .”11
The two crucial entities involved in PFM are the state, which is bound
by the local laws and the Constitution to protect and conserve forests,
and the local communities, which traditionally depend on forests for
their sustenance. Despite the apparent government-community protec-
tor-beneficiary relationship that supposes the community to be a
beneficiary and the government to be a protector, these roles are fre-
quently reversed. More often than not, the forest communities become
the forest guardian while government generates revenues from the
timber, carbon credits,12 and other ecosystem services. Such decentral-
ized management of natural resources has traditionally been a part of
the socio-cultural milieu of many countries, such as Indonesia, Kenya,
India, and Brazil where a high percentage of population is dependent
on forests.
In India, the shift from the traditional community authority
over common forest resources to centralized government control was
the result of colonial rule.13 Indian forests were harvested in large
quantities by the British Empire for establishing railways and revenue
generation. Similarly, colonial Brazil was exploited for its red hard-
10. See NLBI, supra note 5, principle 2(d).
11. See Collaborative Partnership on Forests, Promoting the Sustainable Management
of All Types of Forests (2013), available at http://www.un.org/esa/forests/pdf/
session_documents/unff10/CPF-Brochure.pdf.
12. WORKING GROUP III TO THE 4TH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 731
(Bert Metz et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/
wg3/en/contents.html [hereinafter ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE]. In the forestry sector, carbon credits are a form of investment on
projects which reduce, avoid, or sequester carbon emissions by afforestation, conservation,
or reduction of deforestation. They are stored as carbon stocks on land, in products, and
they are bought as carbon offsets where one carbon offset equates a ton of CO2 removed or
avoided from potential release in the atmosphere.
13. N.H. Ravindranath, K.S. Murali & P. Sudha, Community Forestry Initiatives in
Southeast Asia: A Review of Ecological Impacts, 5 INT’L J. ENV’T & SUSTAINABLE DEV. 1, 2
(2006) [hereinafter Community Forestry Initiatives].
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wood and other natural resources by the Portuguese, French, and
Dutch.14 The blanket colonial restrictions on local communities to ac-
cess and use forest resources outlawed traditional management
regimes and widened the political gap between forest officials and local
communities.15 Lack of transparency and accountability in the deci-
sions on forest concession by the post-colonial governments and the
absence of procedural rights in many environmental laws have played
a big role in alienating forest-dependent communities from their tradi-
tional forest resources.16 All of this, along with lack of strict
enforcement laws, led to communal conflicts, forest degradation, and
illegal deforestation. However, recent international commitments, evi-
dence-based scientific and economic reports, and subsequent legal
recognition by the governments of India and Brazil have led to a come-
back of the PFM regime. The IPCC report itself recognizes
participatory approaches involving traditional forest-dwelling commu-
nities as a cost-effective and democratic means to reduce carbon
emissions from deforestation.17 It has the potential to convert the high
“opportunity cost of deforested land” in the form of illegally logged tim-
ber and encroached land value to alternative long-term livelihoods
with equitable benefits within an organized legal framework.18 Par-
ticipatory approaches, if developed with due consideration to socio-
cultural and economic drivers of the region, can effectively overcome
the historical distrust of the communities and establish forest guard-
ian communities around every forest.
II. INDIA COUNTRY PROFILE AND HISTORY OF FOREST GOVERNANCE
India is the largest democracy in the world and is witnessing
rapid economic growth in the fields of information technology, real es-
tate, and infrastructure. It has been ranked as the third most preferred
country for global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) destinations and
among the most prospective host economies for investment in 2012-14,
due to its low-cost Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) services, rich
resources, and massive workforce.19 Three biodiversity hotspots of the
14. Colony, BRASIL.GOV.BR, http://www2.brasil.gov.br/sobre/history/periods (last visited
Sept. 5, 2014).
15. See Community Forestry Initiatives, supra note 13, at 2.
16. ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
supra note 12, at 731.
17. Id. at 731.
18. Id.
19. PESTLE Country Analysis Report: India, MARKETLINE, Sept. 2012, at 13 (on file
with author).
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world are located in India, accounting for 7 to 8% of the world’s species
which are imperiled due to overexploitation of resources, over-popula-
tion, and climate change.20 Rich biodiversity contributes considerably
to the ecosystem services, such as food, clean water, climate regulation,
disease control, and pollination, as well as to the tourism industry.
Apart from these, the Indian economy includes agriculture, to which
more than half of the workforce is dedicated.21 However, this growth is
slowed down by corruption, regional violence, inflation, caste discrimi-
nation, ineffective administration, and agricultural infrastructure.22
As a result, the country’s growth has been geographically and socially
uneven.23 Such uneven growth has led to grave disparity between the
urban middle class and the communities dependent on agriculture and
forests. This disparity has resulted in internal political unrest amongst
many other problems that have historically been exploited by colonial
countries, and later by political and terrorist groups, to cause an inter-
nal breakdown of governance, especially in regions rich in forest and
natural resources.
Natural resources, not just limited to forest resources, have al-
ways been an integral part of the Indian ethos and have been valued in
religious texts. Numerous books in ancient India, like Vedas, en-
couraged the notion that nature is a “presiding deity” in need of
preservation which gave rise to a concept of cultural landscapes such
as sacred groves and temple forests.24 Various fragments of forests,
natural vegetation, or specific species of trees continue to be protected
from any kind of human interference by local communities due to their
medicinal and aesthetic qualities or religious associations.25 In the
state of Himachal Pradesh alone, there are 5,000 documented sacred
groves, and Maharashtra has documented 1,600 such areas.26 How-
20. Biodiversity in India: Megadiverse India, INDIA BIODIVERSITY PORTAL, http://
thewesternghats.indiabiodiversity.org/biodiversity_in_india (last visited Sept. 5, 2014).
21. The World Factbook: India, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html (last updated June 22, 2014).
22. See MARKETLINE, supra note 19, at 13.
23. Id. at 13.
24. See generally BM Kumar, Forestry in Ancient India: Some Literary Evidences of
Protective and Productive Aspects, 12 ASIAN AGRI-HISTORY 299 (2008), available at http://
www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/Forestry%20in%20ancient%20India.pdf.
25. Alison A. Ormsby & Shonil A. Bhagwat, Sacred Forests of India: A Strong
Tradition of Community-Based Natural Resource Management, 37 ENVTL. CONSERV. 320,
320-1 (2010); see also Sacred Groves of India, ACTIVEREMEDY, at 1, http://www.activeremedy
.org.uk/pages/files/other/Sacred_Groves_of_India.pdf (last visited Spet. 5, 2014) (the
northeastern tribes of Garo and Khasi prohibit any anthropogenic interference in their
forests, while central Indian tribes called Gonds prohibit disturbing living trees).
26. Sacred Groves of India, supra note 25, at 3.
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ever, the existence of these forest ecosystems is increasingly under
threat due to rapid urbanization, development interventions by the
government, and the dwindling belief of people in the spirituality of the
lands.27 Historically, forests were used extensively as hunting grounds
by the Mughal emperors and were thus preserved and looked after.
However, by the 17th century, timber had become a valuable commod-
ity in many kingdoms of northern India.28 As a result, many parts of
India were subject to rampant deforestation.
The first centralized legal attempt to manage forests in India
was made by the British India Government in 1865, which eventually
took formal shape as the Indian Forest Act in 1927.29 However, these
acts or regulations were mainly directed at commercial interests and
revenue generation for the state facilitating the government’s control
over forests, thereby depriving numerous communities of their tradi-
tional rights over forests.30
Shortly after independence, the Indian government introduced
the National Forest Policy in 1952, which sought to revise the colonial
forest policy. This was, however, an extension of the British policies
and did very little for the forest-dependent communities. Furthermore,
it introduced subsidies for timber-based industries under the guise of
promoting industrial growth, leading to massive felling of trees for
commercial purposes. This was vehemently protested by numerous
communities, the most famous protest being the Chipko movement
wherein activists hugged the trees in order to prevent their felling.
This misdirected forest policy of independent India reduced many for-
est-dependent communities that were traditionally stakeholders in the
forest produce to the status of agricultural laborers. The tribes and vil-
lagers now had to pay for firewood, bamboo, etc. from the forests that
belonged to them. A radical political movement, the Naxalite move-
ment, started demanding forest and land rights for the indigenous
tribes living in the forests from the government and later grew into a
large-scale militant movement to topple the Indian state altogether.
Incidentally, the same region would later become the site of the
first experiment in Joint Forest Management (JFM) in India. Under
this experiment, also known as the “Arabari model,” the profits from
27. Id.
28. Chetan Singh, Forests, Pastoralists and Agrarian Society in Mughal India, in
ENVIRONMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA: AN INTRODUCTION 63
(Archana Prasad ed., 1st ed. 2008).
29. Kulbhushan Balooni, Participatory Forest Management in India- An Analysis of
Policy Trends Amid ‘Management Change’, in POLICY TREND REPORT 2002 88, available at
http://enviroscope.iges.or.jp/modules/envirolib/upload/371/attach/07_India.pdf.
30. Id. at 89.
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the forest produce was shared among the villagers. The model system-
atically provided villagers with a 25% share in the profits earned from
timber, encouraging the participation of village people in forest
conservation.
These experiences led the Government of India to introduce a
new National Forest Policy in 1988, drastically different from its pred-
ecessor of 1952. This policy recognized, for the first time, the
traditional rights of the villagers living near the forests and loosened
the grip of the state over forest resources. Above all, it hailed the
“Arabari Model” of sharing the revenue of forest produce and recom-
mended its replication by all state governments.31
A. Evolution of Joint Forest Management (JFM)
India owns huge assets in the form of large tracts of land under
forest cover which is projected to be about 64 million hectares (19% of
the country’s area) and contributes to 1.7% of its GDP.32 Besides being
one of the few remaining biodiversity hotspots in the world, these for-
ests serve as homes and sources of livelihood to many indigenous
tribes.33 They depend on the Minor Forest Produce or Non-timber For-
est Produce (NTFPs) to derive fodder, firewood, medicinal plants,
gums, resins, latex, essential oils, etc., which also contribute to the
GDP of the country.34  Although 60% of the NTFPs are consumed lo-
cally, NTFP contribute to 50% of the income generated by at least 30%
of the rural or forest-dependent population.35 On the other hand, the
demands of the extractive industries cause large-scale diversion of for-
est land. The timber trade, a great source of revenue generation, is
government-owned.36 Apart from timber, fuel wood consumption in In-
dia contributes to meet 40% of its domestic energy requirements.
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Na-
31. Ajit Kumar Banerjee, Participatory Forest Management in West Bengal: A Review
of Policies and Implementation 29 (Understanding Livelihood Impacts of Participatory
Forest Management Implementation in India and Nepal, Working Paper No. 3, 2004),
available at http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/R8101c.pdf.
32. Forest and the Forestry Sector, U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., http://www.
fao.org/forestry/country/57478/en/ind/ (last updated May 3, 2012).
33. Indigenous Peoples in India, INT’L WORK GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, http://
www.iwgia.org/regions/asia/india (last visited Sept. 5, 2014) (there are 461 indigenous
tribes in India which are called Scheduled Tribes under the Constitution of India).
34. FAO, supra note 32 (almost 50% of the total revenue from the forest sector is
generated from sale of NTFPs).
35. See id. (around 400 million forest-fringe populations extract NTFPs for sustenance
and supplemental income).
36. See id.
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tions (FAO), this consumption is five times higher than what can be
sustainably harvested from the forests, lowering India’s per capita
availability of forest land in the world.37
The 1980s were a watershed period in India for forest manage-
ment and saw a paradigm shift in the outlook of policy-makers. Rapid
deforestation was prevalent as a result of the state policies that en-
couraged industrial growth and “accepted virtually no customary
rights of the people or private corporations.”38 Illegal felling of trees by
local communities was also responsible for this in equal measure.
Robbed of their traditional rights over the forests, many tribal commu-
nities resorted to smuggling timber and other forest produce, which
exacerbated the pressure on forests.39 Even though the rate of defores-
tation has reduced due to several efforts over a few decades, it is
nowhere close to fulfilling the target of increasing the forest cover to
33%.40 The natural forests of India, on the other hand, are facing an
alarming rate of qualitative loss.41 Therefore, the Ministry of Environ-
ment and Forest (MoEF) envisioned engaging communities for
strategic, cost-effective, and sustainable improvement of natural
forests.
B. Institutional Arrangement under JFM Regime
The culmination of all these policies was the National Forest
Policy (NFP) of 1988.42 The NFP called for “creating a massive people’s
movement with the involvement of women to minimize the pressure on
forests.”43 In addition to targeting the conservation of forests, it em-
phasized sustainable production of forest resources for the benefit of
people living in adjoining areas.44 NFP recommended various state
governments to implement aspects of JFM in their legislations, so as to
37. See id. (India’s per capita availability of forest land is 0.08 Hectares as opposed to
0.5 and 0.64 for the average per capita availability in developing countries and the world,
respectively).
38. See Banerjee, supra note 31, at 17, 21 (in the mid-1980s India lost forest cover at
the rate of 47,500 hectares per year).
39. Id. at 22.
40. Forest Policy: Introduction, MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT, FOREST & CLIMATE CHANGE
(Mar. 24, 2014), http://envfor.nic.in/division/introduction-10.
41. See id. (average forest Biomass available per capita in the Indian natural forests is
6 ton/ha. compared to an average of 82 ton/ha. in the developing countries).
42. The National Forest Policy, Res. No. 3-1/86-FP of 1988, INDIA CODE (1988),
available at http://envfor.nic.in/sites/default/files/introduction-nfp.pdf.
43. See Balooni, supra note 29, at 94.
44. Id.
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establish uniform policies across the country.45 By 1992, nearly 50% of
all the states in India had adopted JFM in some form or another, by
involving local communities in the restoration and protection of the for-
est resources.46  For establishing the community-based forest
management system NFP identified “Protection Units,” constituted
from a village or a group of villages in the vicinity of a patch of forested
land, which were responsible for protecting the forest. The policy was
conveniently flexible, assigning an array of socio-government entities,
ranging from a village committee to a government-instituted council to
a youth group to a council of village elders (Panchayat), to look after a
certain forest.47 These decision-making forums could constitute their
own guidelines for preservation of their forest area as a community.48
Furthermore, the policy aims to reward the participating communities
for their efforts.49
A salient feature in the constitution of such JFM Committees
(JFMCs) is the compulsory representation of all sectors of society in
the membership.50 It is the highest-level formal institution under the
three-tier JFM institutional framework within a state (district, block,
and village or Panchayat level).51 In addition to officials of the forest
department, local NGOs, and Panchayat members, a number of states
have made it mandatory to provide representation to underprivileged
communities and groups, such as lower castes, women, and indigenous
peoples.52 Such participation from historically underrepresented
groups has resulted in a more equitable benefit-sharing within the par-
ticipating communities.53 There is, however, great variation in the
institutional arrangement of JFMCs from state to state, based on their
different forest cover and socio-economic conditions. Their powers and
functions vary in terms of the flexibility and authority in executive,
45. National Forest Policy, supra note 42, at 9-10 (Policy No. 4.15).
46. MANISH TIWARY, PARTICIPATORY FOREST POLICIES AND POLITICS IN INDIA: JOINT
FOREST MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS IN JHARKHAND AND WEST BENGAL 23 (1st ed. 2004).
47. See CZECH CONROY, LEARNING FROM SELF-INITIATED COMMUNITY FOREST
MANAGEMENT GROUPS IN ORISSA: FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT, VOLUME 1 22 (2001), available at
http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/NatResSys/R6787FTR1.pdf.
48. Id.
49. National Forest Policy, supra note 42, at 6 (Policy No. 4.6).
50. See CONROY, supra note 47, at 65.
51. APPUKUTTANNAIR DAMODARAN & STEFANIE ENGEL, JOINT FOREST MANAGEMENT IN
INDIA: ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATION OF IMPACTS 27, (2003), available at
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/18752/1/dpdp0077.pdf.
52. Id. at 32 (The state of Andhra Pradesh, for example, requires a compulsory 30% of
its representation be women).
53. Id. at 16.
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administrative, and economic matters from state to state. Broadly, the
powers accorded to JFMCs are the following:54
• Rights, including trade, over specific forest resources;
• Freedom to formulate rules catering to the local forests;
• Financial powers to take care of the expenses incurred;
• Formulation of executive bodies and the right to vote for
them;
• Punitive powers over offenders including monetary fines; and
• Freedom to reconstitute the executive bodies by expulsion of
existing members on the grounds of irregularity and
indiscipline.
Apart from these powers, the JFMCs partake in benefits from
the forest areas under their supervision. There are two ways in which
JFMCs receive benefits from the forest resources they manage: “need-
based” and “equal” sharing. Need-based sharing is typically imple-
mented in the case of timber, which is required by most households in
villages.55 The amount of timber each household is entitled to is usu-
ally restricted by the forest department. Equal sharing is applied when
timber harvesting is performed under government supervision in the
managed forests. Communities participating in JFM are entitled to full
access/equitable share of non-timber products like flowers, fruits,
twigs, straw, and cattle-feed.56 In addition, certain states accord up to
50% to the local villagers for the revenue obtained from the sale of tim-
ber and in fines collected from convicted smugglers.57 Such measures
have been adopted in a number of states to encourage the local commu-
nities’ participation and to enlist their cooperation in forest
protection.58
Protection is implemented primarily in the form of patrolling by
“watchers.” In certain cases, Panchayat members have instituted spe-
cial funds for the purpose of supporting patrols around their forests.
Offenders are typically fined, chastised by village elders (Panchayat),
and, in extreme cases, handed over to the forest department.59 Cus-
54. Id. at 8-9.
55. See CONROY, supra note 47, at 22.
56. Id.
57. BHAGIRATH BEHERA, DETERMINANTS OF SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES: THE CASE OF JOINT FOREST MANAGEMENT IN INDIA 30 (2006).
58. This and other statements throught the article draw on the author’s experiences
and observations during her work with Enviro Legal Defence Firm on the review of
participatory forest management practices in few states of India.
59. See CONROY, supra note 47, at 22.
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tomary laws of the village play a dominant role in disciplining any acts
of forest violation from within the community.60
All states in India have now adopted JFM policies with some
regional modifications. By the year 2000, the total number of JFMCs
all over India had swollen to nearly 63,000.61 JFM regimes operate in
around 61% of the open forests and 24% of the total forests in the coun-
try. States with large tribal populations, like Andhra Pradesh, Madhya
Pradesh, and West Bengal, have more than 80% of their open forests
under JFM.62
Overall, the adoption of JFM was a welcome departure from
previous legislation that aimed to make forest resources the exclusive
property of the state.  There has been a noticeable increase in the for-
est cover in the country, accompanied by an increase in bio-diversity
and a corresponding increase in the variety, quality, and quantity of
forest produce available for harvest.63 Communities that depend on
forest resources have benefitted from the employment generated from
JFM. An additional source of income is the sale of the NTFPs. There
are fewer cases of illegal encroachment, smuggling of timber, over-ex-
traction of medicinal plants, etc., due to vigilant protection by the
JFMCs. There has been better leadership among the village communi-
ties as an indirect consequence of sharing of responsibilities and
benefits. Women’s empowerment has also been bolstered, albeit to a
limited extent in most areas.64 Education of village communities has
led to better understanding of modern technology and increased usage
of environmentally friendly fuel sources such as biomass and bio-gas.65
Environmental benefits from JFM include better canopy cover, in-
crease in the water table, increase in soil moisture retention, and a
dramatic decrease in soil erosion, leading to better quality of soil.66
60. Based on author’s experiences and observations. See supra note 58.
61. Yogesh D. Jadhav, Implementing Tropical Forest Sustainability Model in Central
India (2003), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/ARTICLE/WFC/XII/0838-C1
.htm#P28_106.
62. K.S. Murali et al., Institutional and Policy Issues of Participatory Forestry: Indian
Experience, 44 TROPICAL ECOLOGY 73, 77 (2003), available at http://www.tropecol.com/pdf/
open/PDF_44_1/44108.pdf.
63. Sudha P & Ravindranath N H, Evolution of Forest Policies and the Spread of Joint
Forest Management in India, in JOINT FOREST MANAGEMENT IN INDIA: SPREAD,
PERFORMANCE AND IMPACT 164 (N H Ravindranath & P Sudha eds., 2004) [hereinafter
Evolution of Forest Policies].
64. N H RAVINDRANATH & P SUDHA, JOINT FOREST MANAGEMENT IN INDIA: SPREAD,
PERFORMANCE AND IMPACT 75 & 327 (2004) [hereinafter JOINT FOREST MANAGEMENT IN
INDIA].
65. Id. at 293, 327.
66. Id. at 14.
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There has been a visible impact in terms of the restoration of defor-
ested areas. Qualitatively, JFM has managed to enlist the support of
entire communities that felt marginalized due to earlier, repressive
laws concerning forest resources.67
C. Limitations of the JFM regime
Despite all listed achievements, more than two decades after
the first directive in favor of JFM was introduced in India, it has not
yet reached the level that was envisaged by the policy-makers.
Weak Legal Basis: There are numerous legal issues that need to
be resolved as far as JFM is concerned. The regime, in general, failed
to operate as a “preemptive” and “preventive” legal tool in the forest
governance landscape of India.68 Concern exists over the inclusion of
the directives stated in the National Forest Policy of 1988 in the even-
tual revision of the Indian Forest Act of 1927.69 Each is essentially at
loggerheads with the other, rendering ambiguity over the supremacy of
one over the other. The 1990 circular calling for JFM implementation
in India is no more than a “direction-setting document” stating the
needs and objectives of engaging forest-fringe communities by sharing
usufructs from governmental afforestation programs.70 The basis of
the circular is itself a forest policy which is only “opinion of the House”
of Parliament and thus is not legally binding.71 Hence, acting upon
such an opinion is entirely at the discretion of the existing government,
not a mandate to entrust long-term management of the forests.
As a corollary, the State JFM resolutions, pursuant to JFM Cir-
cular of 1990, lack force of law because these are executive orders
without any enabling legislation on forest conservation. Nevertheless,
some states, such as Jammu and Kashmir and Uttar Pradesh, have
based their JFM program on the State Forest Acts to provide strong
legal footing.72 This goes a long way in instilling confidence in local
people to participate in the JFM program.
Institutional Concerns: JFMCs or Forest Protection Commit-
tees, Village Forest Committees (VFCs), and Van Samrakhshan
67. FORESTS FOR POVERTY REDUCTION: CHANGING ROLE FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT
AND TRAINING INSTITUTIONS (H.C. Sim, S. Appanah & N. Hooda eds., 2005), available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/af349e/af349e00.htm.
68. Sanjay Upadhyay, JFM in India: Some Legal Concerns, 35 ECON. & POL. WEEKLY 1
(2003).
69. See Murali et al., supra note 62, at 78.
70. See Upadhyay, supra note 68, at 2.
71. Id. (citing SUBHASH KASHYAP, OUR PARLIAMENT, NBT, 108 (1989)).
72. Id.
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Samitis are some village-level organizations that the JFM regime re-
lies upon for effective management of forest resources.73 However,
there is no statutory recognition for JFMCs and VFCs as they are not
registered or recognized by any government agency.74 These can be
summarily dissolved by the government’s forest department officials,
creating doubts as to their continued existence.75  Further, it is unclear
as to what status VFCs have in relation to constitutionally recognized
village self-governing bodies such as the Panchayats.76
Accountability of Memorandum of Understanding: Another con-
cern is the nature of agreement between the participating community
members and the forest department. In most states the agreement be-
tween the JFMC and the forest department is no more than a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which dictates the responsibil-
ities of all the stakeholders involved.77 The language of such
memoranda has been often found to be very equivocal and, in most
cases, empowers the forest department.78 The JFMCs are
overburdened with multiple duties and responsibilities and may be dis-
solved if their performance is found to be unsatisfactory; however,
what exactly constitutes “satisfactory performance of the duties . . . by
the committee” is not clearly defined in most cases and is open to inter-
pretation.79 Interestingly, there is no mention of the consequences of
the states’ non-performance of their duties under the MoU, which fur-
ther expands the scope for unfair administration of the regime. The
most serious legal flaw of the JFM directive is the absence of the proce-
dure to seek redress in case of violation of rights of the JFMC
members.80 In some cases, this has led to exploitation of the village
communities by the forest department officials.
Legal Status of JFMCs: In most cases, the forest department
has legal rights over the forest lands and, sometimes, the land is leased
out to the JFMCs.81 This creates a complicated legal situation since
JFMCs have no legal status, and, hence, leasing land to them becomes
difficult.82 In practice, JFMCs are registered by the Divisional Forest
Officer (DFO), who is not the appropriate authority to register under
73. See Upadhyay, supra note 68, at 3.
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id. at 2, 3.
76. See Murali et al., supra note 62, at 78.
77. See Upadhyay, supra note 68, at 2.
78. Id. at 2.
79. Id. at 2.
80. See Upadhyay, supra note 68, at 3.
81. See Murali et al., supra note 62, at 78.
82. See id.
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the Indian Registration Act. To resolve this issue, the Central govern-
ment issued guidelines for the registration of JFMCs under the
Societies Registration Act, 1860,83 which is a reflection of government’s
myopic manner of resolving policy issues.
Conflicts over Forest Land: One of the aims of the 1990 JFM
circular is the acquisition and rehabilitation of “degraded lands.”84
This typically refers to barren land or extensively deforested land. The
major challenge lies in the procurement of such lands for restoration.
Apart from the ambiguous terms and conditions of the lease, the
boundaries of such degraded lands are not clearly demarcated, leading
to further confusion. There have been numerous cases wherein the for-
est lands fall under the purview of multiple villages/hamlets, leading
to conflicts between the village communities over lease rights.85 At
times, such degraded lands are illegally occupied. When the en-
croachers are themselves tribals, lengthy court battles are often fought
over the question of land ownership under JFM scheme and Forest
Rights Act.86
Finance for Funding JFMs: JFM programs in villages are
funded either through community funding, government funding, or a
combination of the two. The government of India established the Na-
tional Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) for the
purpose of financing rural, agro-centric projects.87 However, the contri-
bution of NABARD towards afforestation activities has been
insignificant.88 Most states depend extensively on external funding by
various international organizations like the World Bank, the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Danish Interna-
tional Development Agency (DANIDA), etc.89  Studies showed that
83. Ministry of Env’t & Forests, Guidelines for Strengthening of Joint Forest
Management (JFM) Programme, Res. No. 22-8/2000-JFM (FPD, Feb. 21, 2000), available at
http://www.pbforests.gov.in/pdfs/policies/JFM%20Guidelines.pdf [hereinafter 2000
Guidelines for Strengthening JFM].
84. Ministry of Env’t & Forests, The Circular Concerning Joint Forest Management,
No. 6-21/89-P.P (Jun. 1, 1990), available at http://ielrc.org/content/e9004.pdf [hereinafter
JFM Circular].
85. Gov’t of Orissa, Forest & Env’t Dept., Joint Forest Management Resolution, 2008,
No.IF-Affn.17/2008-17454/F&E (Oct. 22, 2008), available at http://www.odisha.gov.in/
forest_environment/Forest_resolution/pdf/17454_22.10.08.pdf.
86. See Balooni, supra note 29, at 98 (FRA recognizes the rights of indigenous
communities to own piece of land they have been historically subsisting up on).
87. The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development Act, 1981, No. 61, Acts
of Parliament, 1982 (India), available at http://www.bu.edu/bucflp/files/2012/01/National-
Bank-for-Agriculture-and-Rural-Development-Act-No.-61-of-1981.pdf.
88. See Balooni, supra note 29, at 99.
89. See Murali et al., supra note 62, at 81.
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\9-2\fam110.txt unknown Seq: 16  8-APR-15 8:21
324 FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 9:2:309
states that received substantial external aid have performed better
than those that have not.90
Flaws in Benefit Distribution: The benefit sharing methodology
advocated by JFM has also come under considerable criticism for being
unfair to the JFMCs. The benefit obtained by the JFMC through sale of
timber as well as NTFPs varies between 20% and 100% from state to
state.91 However, there is a clause that dictates that the benefit has to
be calculated “minus the operation cost of such harvesting.”92 The defi-
nition of “operating costs” has been widened in most states to include
expenses, such as office maintenance and officials’ salaries, incurred by
the JFM office itself. This reduces the overall benefit obtained by vil-
lage communities to a great extent.93
Furthermore, there is no rule to ensure equity in benefit shar-
ing.94 The percentage of benefit shared with the JFMC is often heavily
skewed in favor of the forest department. Even in states like Gujarat,
Karnataka, and Orissa, where benefit is shared equally between the
JFMCs and the forest department, 50% of the JFMCs’ share is used for
development of the village and adjoining forest areas.95 The rest is
shared amongst the JFMC in a manner whose equality is dubious. The
forest department does not contribute towards the development funds
of the village or forests.96 Inherent socio-economic hierarchy at village
level causes further inequity in distribution of benefits. The common
community fund is often used for purposes that benefit rich, upper
class and influential men more than other sections.97 It is widely felt
that the remuneration paid to local communities for JFM activities is
inadequate.98
Gender and Marginalized Concerns: Though the JFM circular
has progressive gender approach and a number of state governments
stipulate a certain percentage of women membership in JFMCs, the
participation by women continues to be unsatisfactory. Certain states
require both men and women from a household to be part of the gen-
90. See id. at 78.
91. See id. at 81.
92. See Upadhyay, supra note 68, at 4.
93. Id.
94. See Murali et al., supra note 62, at 80-81.
95. See id. at 81.
96. See id.
97. See CONROY, supra note 47, at 24.
98. See DAMODARAN & ENGEL, supra note 51, at 15.
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eral body.99 Even in such cases, the participation by men and women is
found to be unequal.100
Counterintuitively, it is women from poor households who often
depend on NTFPs for their daily activities.101 The emphasis placed
upon the sale of timber to generate revenues has also been criticized
because it does not address the day-to-day fuel needs of poor women.102
It only caters to the richer sections of the village who can afford re-
placement to fuel wood for future gains from timber sale.103 JFM’s
assumption of trickle-down benefits for women has not been met in
reality.
No Incremental Benefits: Despite formulation of JFM policies,
illegal extraction of forest resources is rampant, difficult to monitor,
and has the potential to overturn the benefits gained from JFM.104
Typically, the village communities’ participation with government in
forest protection scheme falls under three categories: full participation
with no extra use, no participation with self-use, and full participation
with extra use.105 While the government expects people to participate
fully with no extra use granted to them, communities prefer to partici-
pate for benefits or not at all. That the wages given to members of
JFMC and workers involved in forest protection is fixed, and not based
on their performance, has limited wholehearted participation by forest-
fringe communities.106 The lack of any performance-based incentives
demotivates poor village communities who feel their work is not
rewarded.107
Creation of Parallel Power Structures: Village self-governance
councils, called Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs), have been given
certain powers pertaining to social forestry and minor forest produce
through the 73rd amendment of the Indian Constitution.108 There is
an emerging conflict between the administrative powers of PRIs and
JFMCs since there is no clarity as to forestry management functions of
99. See Murali et al., supra note 62, at 79-80.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 80.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Nimai Das & Debnarayan Sarker, Impact of a moral hazard problem in the Joint
Forest Management Programme: A study from forest-dependent households in West Bengal,
12 J. ECON. POL’Y REFORM 323, 324 (2009).
105. Id. at 325.
106. Id. at 330.
107. Id. at 325.
108. See Upadhyay, supra note 68, at 4.
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the PRIs which many feel should be limited to monitoring only.109
There are major legal and administrative decisions where the func-
tions of both PRIs and JFMCs overlap, and this has led to inter-
institutional conflicts.110 Similarly, the Forest Rights Act of 2006
(FRA) empowers Gram Sabha (village assemblies, consisting of every
household) to delineate traditionally accessed forest area and to sus-
tainably manage such Community Forest Resource (CFR).111 This duty
of Gram Sabha (and Forest Protection Committees (FPCs), further
constituted by Gram Sabha) comes in conflict with the duties of the
JFMCs and creates implementation overlap at the forest area.112
Moreover, the traditional forest rights of indigenous and other forest
dwelling communities recognized under FRA may come in conflict with
the JFM benefits or rights of the JFMCs engaged in existing forest
management practices.113
After the National Forest Policy of 1988 and the JFM Circular
of 1990,114 there have been a number of guidelines and directives
passed by the central government that have sought to rectify some of
the shortcomings of these two policies. Many of the drawbacks of the
1990 directive on JFM were remedied in the February 2000 guideline
issued by the government of India.115 A number of positive steps were
taken regarding status of FPCs. By law, they are required to be regis-
tered under the Societies Registration Act116 with compulsory
membership of every adult in a particular village. The names of FPCs
were required to be uniform in all states as JFMCs, providing these
committees with a legal status.117 In order to ensure greater participa-
tion by women, the guidelines of February 2000 made it mandatory for
all general bodies of JFMCs to have 50% female membership.118 Fur-
109. Pankaj Lal & Panchayati Raj, Institutions and Joint Forest Management
Committees: Forging Linkages – Part 2, INFORM, Jan. 2007, at 5, 7 (author records various
conflicts between PRIs and JFMCs in many states of India where JFM is working).
110. See Upadhyay, supra note 68, at 4.
111. The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest
Rights) Act, 2006, § 2(a), No. 2 of 2007, available at http://www.ielrc.org/content/e0618.pdf
[hereinafter F.R.A.].
112. ENVIRO LEGAL DEFENCE FIRM, SYNERGIZING THE CONSERVATION REGIME IN FOREST
RIGHTS ACT WITH THE EXISTING PARTICIPATORY FOREST MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: POLICY NOTE
4 (Sept. 2010).
113. Id. at 5.
114. JFM Circular, supra note 84.
115. 2000 Guidelines for Strengthening JFM, supra note 83.
116. The Societies Registration Act, Act no. 21 of 1860 (India), available at http://www.
bu.edu/bucflp/files/2012/01/Societies-Registration-Act-No.-21.pdf.
117. 2000 Guidelines for Strengthening JFM, supra note 83.
118. Id.
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ther, the executive bodies were to have a minimum of one-third female
membership with at least one woman as an office bearer.119 The quo-
rum for holding a general body meeting was raised to 50% female
members.120
The guideline established clear-cut rules for the sharing of tim-
ber revenue in degraded and non-degraded forests.121 Further, the
boundary demarcation for different forest areas with respect to sur-
rounding villages was resolved on the basis of a uniform measurement,
thereby solving many of the inter-village conflicts arising because of
the lack of a clear boundary.122 The guideline sought to make use of
local knowledge to strengthen local institutions. Most importantly, the
guidelines called for the establishment of state-level representative fo-
rums and working groups to resolve conflicts arising out of JFM
related issues.123 Self-initiated groups which were hitherto left outside
the gambit of JFM were asked to be provided with recognition after
evaluating their performance.124
The guideline laid down mechanisms for ensuring transparency
in revenue generated from the sale of forest produce.125 It has set a
minimum share of 25% for the village communities and has directed
the forest department to make a similar monetary contribution to-
wards the forest development funds, thereby ending the inequity
between the forest department and the JFMCs.126 Now, the guideline
calls for supervision and monitoring of progress at intervals of three to
five years at district and state levels.127
Another set of guidelines was issued in December 2002, which
called for treating the JFMCs as “basic forest management units” on
signing of a MoU with the forest department.128 It also recommends
giving far reaching monetary powers to JFMCs so they can provide in-
centives to all stakeholders.129
119. Id.
120. See DAMODARAN & ENGEL, supra note 51, at 15.
121. 2000 Guidelines for Strengthening JFM, supra note 83.
122. Id.
123. See DAMODARAN & ENGEL, supra note 51, at 15.
124. Id. at 20.
125. 2000 Guidelines for Strengthening JFM, supra note 83.
126. See DAMODARAN & ENGEL, supra note 51, at 20.
127. Id. at 21.
128. Ministry of Env’t & Forests, Strengthening of Joint Forest Management (JFM)
Programme, Res. No.22-8/2000-JFM (FPD Dec. 24, 2002), available at http://www.ielrc.org/
content/e0225.pdf.
129. Id.
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The government of India has also introduced certain initiatives
at the highest level, which aim to aid the JFM movement at the grass
root level. The first step was the creation of a JFM monitoring cell
under the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF).130 It is the
responsibility of these cells to collect relevant information about the
progress of JFM related activities, so that the data can be analyzed in
order to form future policy.131 Additionally, a multi-stakeholder JFM
network was also created at the national level for providing feedback to
the policy makers from all relevant perspective.132 Establishment of
such monitoring and consultation institutions at the national level in
itself is not sufficient in the absence of strong adherence to the rule of
law. It is difficult to say that the procedural rights of the JFM commu-
nities can be duly respected in the absence of substantive legal basis of
their partnership with the government institutions. The information
generated and data collected by the new institutions can be biased, and
the decisions made by officials can easily surpass the due process of
law.
D. Role of Indian Judiciary & Access to Justice
The Supreme Court of India is the highest court in the judicial
structure, while each state has its own High Court. Further, each dis-
trict has a District Court. Starting from its involvement at the
Stockholm Conference,133 the Indian judiciary has played a vital role
in the protection of environment, forests, and wildlife. Judicial activ-
ism and public interest litigation (PIL) have made a valuable
contribution in advancing the rule of law and enhancing public access
to justice, especially the Green Bench of the Supreme Court of India,
which has the jurisdiction to entertain PIL on environmental mat-
ters.134 In case of a fundamental rights infringement by the State,
130. Ministry of Env’t & Forests, Joint Forest Management: A Decade of Partnership,
(2002), Joint Forest Monitoring Cell, Ministry of Env’t & Forests, Government of India.
131. Id.
132. See DAMODARAN & ENGEL, supra note 51, at 22.
133. See generally U.N. Conference on Human Environment (Stockholm Conference),
Stockholm, June 5-16, 1972, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (Nov. 1973), available at http://
www.un-documents.net/aconf48-14r1.pdf (judges from India participated in this conference
to ameliorate the role of judiciary in environmental justice).
134. Jacob Werksman, Forward to GEORGE PRING & CATHERINE PRING, THE ACCESS
INITIATIVE, GREENING JUSTICE: CREATING AND IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS v-vi (WRI 2009) (ART 32 and 226 empower Supreme Court and High Court of
India respectively to issue orders to protect any individual from violation of any
fundamental right).
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including procedural rights,135 the Court has the power to take up a
matter suo moto (or sua sponte).
Judicial intervention, however, in the arena of JFM has not yet
emerged. The possible reason for this is relatively lower economic
stakes in the PFM disputes.136 The role of the judiciary in expanding
the scope of petitions is evident from the establishment of Centrally
Empowered Committee (CEC), the first national level, quasi-judicial
body to deal with forestry matters.137 It was constituted under the Su-
preme Court’s judicial order in the on-going Godavarman Case.138 It
has been created under the Environmental Protection Act and is
tasked with the authority to monitor the implementation of the court
orders, investigate, and bring the cases of non-compliance before the
court.139 It has the power to decide and formulate its own procedures to
speedily deal with the cases of non-compliance.140 The recommenda-
tions of CEC substantially shape policy decisions in forestry. This
includes establishment of Compensatory Afforestation Fund (CAF) and
Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Author-
ity (CAMPA), and their modalities.141 The judiciary has gone beyond
its role of dispute-resolution body to a guiding body for new policy and
clearer forest terminology such as more inclusive definition of forest
produce, which have a direct implication upon the JFM regime.142 Fur-
thermore, in 2010 legislation was passed to set up a specialized
environmental tribunal called the National Green Tribunal (NGT), for
effective and expeditious disposal of environmental matters.143 This in-
cludes cases on “enforcement of any legal right relating to environment
and giving relief and compensation for damages to persons and prop-
erty . . . .”144 Non-recognition of the legal status of JFMCs and MoUs
poses a big impediment to access justice at NGT.
135. INDIA CONST. art 14 (article 14 requires the observance of principles of natural
justice in delivering justice to public).
136. SANJAY UPADHYAY & APOORVA MISHRA, ENVIRO LEGAL DEFENCE FIRM, THE ROLE OF
JUDICIARY-INFLUENCING FORESTRY PRACTICES AND POLICIES IN INDIA- IMPLICATIONS ON
PARTICIPATORY FORESTRY MANAGEMENT 4 (2006).
137. Id. at 6.
138. T.N. Godavarman v. Union of India, W.P. (C) 202 of 1995 (India).
139. UPADHYAY & MISHIRA, supra note 136, at 20.
140. Id. at 20.
141. Id. at 5, 17.
142. Id. at 25-26.
143. The National Green Tribunal Act, No. 19 of 2010, INDIA CODE (2010), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/.
144. Id.
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III. BRAZIL COUNTRY PROFILE AND HISTORY OF FOREST GOVERNANCE
Brazil shares many similar geo-political and economic charac-
teristics with India. It is the fifth largest country in the world and has
a population of about 190 million.145 It is experiencing a period of fast
economic growth and is ranked as the seventh largest economy in the
world in 2010.146 It is a mega biodiversity region with the largest area
of tropical forest in the world,147 a home to one-fourth of the world’s
plant species and 6% of the world’s endangered species.148 Apart from
the well-known Amazon Basin which covers more than 300 million
hectares,149 the Atlantic Forest in Southern Brazil covered an area of
around 130 million hectares.150 These carbon sinks and rich biodivers-
ity hotspots have been facing high rate of fragmentation and forest
deforestation.151 In 2005, it was estimated to be left with only 12% of
its original forest cover.152 Over three centuries of colonial resource ex-
ploitation by the Portuguese and economic growth from commodity-
exporting policies of the patrimonial governance, Brazil’s picture per-
fect landscape has wrinkled.153 Deforestation had further crept into
the remote areas of Amazons due to rapid industrialization and
urbanization.154
For a long time, global trade incentives and political instability
in Brazil showed a blind eye to the world’s most diverse tracts of
forestlands.155 The expansion of sugar cultivation, Brazilian wood and
mineral extraction, clearing of land for cattle ranching, rubber, and cof-
fee plantations for export has contributed to local employment and
income.156 At the same time this has added to the plight of forest dwell-
145. Nicholas S. Bryner, Brazil’s Green Court: Environmental Law in the Superior
Tribunal De Justica (High Court of Brazil), 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 470, 470 (2012).
146. Id.
147. Forest and the Forestry Sector, supra note 32.
148. See Bryner, supra note 145, at 470.
149. Forest and the Forestry Sector, supra note 32.
150. Carlos Alberto B. Mesquita et al., COOPLANTAR: A Brazilian Initiative to
Integrate Forest Restoration with Job and Income Generation in Rural Areas, 28
ECOLOGICAL RESTORORATION 199 (2010).
151. Stephen G. Perz et al., Road Networks and Forest Fragmentation in the Amazon:
Explanations for Local Differences with Implications for Conservation and Development, 7 J.
LATIN GEOGRAPHY 1 (2008).
152. Bryner, supra note 145, at 470.
153. History – Periods, PORTAL BRASIL, http://archive.today/eSoD (last visited Sept. 6,
2014).
154. Bryner, supra note 145, at 470.
155. See History – Periods, supra note 153.
156. Id.
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ers. Out of all the extractive industries, timber industry by far has
been the biggest cause for resource consumption in Brazil.157 The Ama-
zon region is known for its wood extractive industry, and around 85%
of its forest production is consumed to supply tropical hardwoods like
Mahogany158 and Sawnwood for the domestic market.159 The forest
sector contributes to 6.9% of Brazil’s total GDP.160 At the same time,
75% of the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from Brazil are estimated
to be caused by deforestation,161 requiring an immediate national gov-
ernance strategy for stronger legal and executive action to prevent
further loss.
A. Evolution of Participatory Forest Management (PFM) in Brazil
Like India, the institutional barriers to the Amazonian
rainforest’s conservation emerge from misguided forest policies, ad-
ministrative irregularities, and disoriented political power structure in
the governance of important ecological affairs.162 Before 1965, the laws
in place provided protection to potential extractors of natural re-
sources.163  Brazil’s forest code,164 Co´digo Florestal, and the eventual
inclusion of a new chapter on environmental principles in the Brazilian
157. Brazil – The Forestry Industry, BRAZIL.ORG, http://www.brazil.org.za/the-forestry-
industry.html#.U-o4aeZdX2B (last visited Sept. 6, 2014).
158. Brazil Ends Mahogany Ban, Sets New Rules, ECOAME´RICAS (JULY 2003) available
at http://www.ecoamericas.com/en/story.aspx?id=452 (in 2001, the felling of Mahogany has
been banned for a period of two year by Brazil’s Environmental-Enforcement Agency
(IBAMA). New restrictive rules, Measure No. 4722 permits harvesting of Mahogany for
private-landowners limited to only 20%of total land).
159. Peter May, Forest Certification in Brazil, in CONFRONTING SUSTAINABILITY: FOREST
CERTIFICATION IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONING COUNTRIES 337, 343 n.9 (Benjamin
Cashore et al. eds., 2006), available at http://environment.research.yale.edu/documents/
downloads/0-9/15_Brazil.pdf.
160. Forest and the Forestry Sector, supra note 32 (statistics based on 2003 report).
161. Rafael D.B. Figueiredo, Brazil’s Forestry Plan Gains Momentum after Poznan, 11
ABA INT’L ENVTL. L. COMMITTEE NEWSL. 17, 17 (2009), available at http://apps.americanbar
.org/environ/committees/intenviron/newsletter/feb09/IELC_Feb09.pdf.
162. Id. at 19.
163. Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Rainforests and Regulation: New Directions in
Brazilian Environmental Law and Legal Institutions: An Introduction to Brazilian
Environmental Law, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 611 (2009).
164. CO´DIGO FLORESTAL [C.FLOR], Lei No. 4,771, de 15 Setembro de 1965, DIARIO
OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] (Braz.), available at http://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/lei/
1960-1969/lei-4771-15-setembro-1965-369026-norma-pl.html; repealed by Lei No. 12.651 de
25.05.2012 (Braz.), available at  http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/
lei/l12651.htm. [hereinafter C.FLOR].
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Constitution165 emphasized Brazil’s commitment that citizens enjoy “a
right to an ecologically balanced environment” as well as have a joint
duty with the government “to defend and preserve [the environment]
for present and future generations.”166  It declares forests as “goods of
common interest”167 and allows its usage only on executive review of
plans.168 The Co´digo Florestal mandates that landowners maintain a
reserve legal (Legal Forest Reserve, 80% of landholding for forest re-
serve) and a´reas de preservac¸a˜o permanente (areas of permanent
protection) in riparian and hilltop zones.169 This regulation has been
ineffective in producing results. Compliance with these forest protec-
tion laws turned out to be difficult to achieve due to complicated
administrative procedures, a weak legal system, non-deterrent sanc-
tions for noncompliance, at Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente E
Dos Recursos Naturais Renova´veis (IBAMA), and subsidies unfavora-
ble for SFM.170 IBAMA, like MoEF, has also put in place a policing
structure for the protection of the Amazon forest through conservation
bodies, and demarcation of protected forest areas.171 However, the gov-
ernment lacks the technical expertise and sufficient funds to ensure
adequate implementation and enforcement.172
Under the Constitution ratified in 1988, the federal government
legislates only general rules, while the states, counties, and specialized
agencies are delegated the function of specific rule-making.173 The
states and federally funded institutions are responsible for monitoring
the forest cover, but these allocated funds are not efficiently utilized.174
A portion of share in revenues in local-level projects is taken by the
National Congress of Brazil for delegating its authority, while the fed-
eral subsidies for development of the iron industry (and earlier cattle
165. CONSTITUTUIC¸A˜O FEDERAL [C.F] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.), Chapter VI, de 25
Mayo de 1988 (English translation available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/
Brazil/english96.html)
166. See Bryner, supra note 145, at 474 (citing C.F, art 225 (Braz.)).
167. See C.FLOR arts. 1, 2, 16.
168. Sofia R. Hirakuri, FOREST LAW ENFORCEMENT GOVERNANCE AND TRADE, CAN LAW
SAVE THE FOREST? LESSONS FROM FINLAND AND BRAZIL 3 (2003), available at http://www.
cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/books/law.pdf.
169. Lesley K. McAllister, Sustainable Consumption Governance in the Amazon, 38
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10873, 10877 (2008).
170. See Hirakuri, supra note 168, at 16.
171. Jacqueline Klosek, The Destruction of the Brazilian Amazon: An International
Problem, 6 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 119, 138 (1998).
172. Id.
173. Emilio F. Moran, The Law, Politics, and Economics of Amazonian Deforestation, 1
IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 397, 399 (1994).
174. Id. at 400.
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ranching industry) contributed greatly to converting taxpayers’ money
in Brazil to large scale deforestation projects.175 Such discriminatory
laws and policies to protect forest in its pristine form have led to wide
spread violence and violation of the rights of native tribes in the strug-
gle for forest land acquisition.176 The indigenous population has been
forced to go “extinct or integrate”177 with modern civilization, causing a
loss of cultural diversity and a tremendous amount of traditional
knowledge on the sustainable use of forest genetic resources.
Public Forests Management Law178 attempts to remedy such
conflicts. It intends to sustainably protect forests of the federal, state,
and local governments by including three management mechanisms:
conservation units (national parks), community forest use areas (forest
settlements), and forest concession/allowance contracts.179 It also es-
tablishes an independent agency, the Brazilian Forest Service180 which
regulates the administrative and financial management of public
forests.
The Fundo Amazonia (Amazon Fund) was also created as part
of its National Climate Change Plan (NCCP) for raising financial re-
sources to incentivize national efforts to reduce deforestation through
economic adaptation, sustainable forest management, and improved
land use practices.181 Brazil’s NCCP, in line with participatory ap-
proach to forestry, explicitly favors inclusion of interested
stakeholders, like indigenous communities, civil society groups, and
private actors in developing national afforestation strategies and fur-
ther incentivizing their efforts.
B. Institutional Arrangements and Implementation of PFM
Under Lei da Polı´tica Nacional do Meio Ambiente (LPNMA)
(the National Environmental Policy Act),182 the National Environmen-
tal Management System (SISNAMA), a strong regulatory system,
175. Id. at 402-3.
176. See Klosek, supra note 171, at 135.
177. Id.
178. Lei No. 11.284, de 3 de Marco de 2006, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
03.03.2006 (Braz.).
179. See Patriota, supra note 163, at 615.
180. See Decreto No. 5,776 de 12 de Mayo de 2006, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
15.05.2006 (Braz.).
181. Id. at 18.
182. Lei da Politica Nacional do Meio Ambiente, Lei No. 6.938, de 31 de Agosto de 1981,
DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] (Braz.), available at http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/
12932POR.doc.
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implements forest policies at a federal, state, and municipal level.183
This three tier structure is similar to India’s JFM’s Central, State, and
Panchayat level structure. Despite the limited budgets for enforce-
ment, IBAMA’s regulatory powers to fill the legislative gaps through
administrative rule-making, instructions, and other resolutions play a
crucial role in “activating” Constitutional law.184  However, the admin-
istrative acts of IBAMA lack the certainty and can be overturned by
judicial or legislative action which makes the forest related regulations
easier to flout.185 The institutional framework also suffers from low co-
ordination capacity between Brazil’s prosecutors and state
environmental agencies due to overlapping jurisdictions.
SFM in Brazil evolved into different participatory regimes in
different locations, depending upon the dominant actors. Given the le-
gal, social, economic, and environmental issues linked with Brazil’s
deforestation, “Locally Adapted Participatory Sustainable Forest Man-
agement” (LapSFM)186 effectively reduces rural poverty and
deforestation through a decentralized approach. It is pertinent that
LapSFM must engage the communities at the lowest rung of this par-
ticipatory approach who are directly affected by creation of alternative
use of natural resources. Despite the Forest Code mandating interven-
tion in forest areas to be conducted on the basis of approved
management plans, illegal logging practices are the norm in Brazil.187
Brazil’s “Cooperative of Reforestation Workers” (known as
COOPLANTAR) was established to integrate Atlantic forest restora-
tion plans with rural livelihood generation in the Monte Pascoal-Pau
Brasil Ecological Corridor (MPPBEC).188 The cooperative specializes in
Atlantic forest restoration, a region which has lost over 85% of its natu-
ral forest cover, and strives to establish an “ecological corridor”
between the protected forest areas and generate incomes for local com-
munities in areas of rich biodiversity.189 This cooperative is based on
the model agreement of 1991, between the Brazilian government and
183. See Hirakuri, supra note 168, at 19.
184. Id. at 14.
185. Id.
186. Andre Eduardo Biscaia de Lacerda et al., Sustainable Forest Management in Rural
Southern Brazil: Exploring Participatory Forest Management Planning, in SUSTAINABLE
FOREST MANAGEMENT – CASE STUDIES 97-8 (Jorge Martin-Garcia & Julio Javier Diez eds.,
2012), available at http://cdn.intechopen.com/pdfs/35232/InTech-Sustainable_forest_man
agement_in_rural_southern_brazil_exploring_participatory_forest_management_planning
.pdf.
187. Id. at 99.
188. See Mesquita, supra note 150, at 199.
189. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\9-2\fam110.txt unknown Seq: 27  8-APR-15 8:21
2014 COMMUNITY-BASED FOREST MANAGEMENT 335
the Pataxo´ Indian Communities living in the park, wherein the park
was converted into Barra Velha Indian Land for SFM. The MPPBEC
contract is, however between the company and the communities. Local
communities joined hands with corporations to restore the ecological
condition of the two national parks threatened by extensive cattle
farming and cash crop cultivation, including the water quality which
adversely affected fish. The project serves a dual purpose of empower-
ing the local Indian communities by engaging them in environmental
and political decision making while simultaneously creating income
generation opportunities. This has introduced a “formal employment
relationship” to the Indian communities.190
Based on the concept of local participation, the community
members play an active and direct role in the selection of areas to be
reforested, planting of native trees, and establishing of “Permanent
Preservation Areas” to improve the riparian zones in the basin. It as-
sured local communities that such restoration-based alternative
livelihood opportunities are feasible and impactful. The noted good
practice in this project was the community members established them-
selves into a Cooperative. They also partnered with private
organizations like the Nature Conservancy and Instituto Bio Atlantica
to gain technical knowledge, information, and cooperative manage-
ment techniques to meet their goals. Interestingly, the state
environmental agencies like IBAMA were not consulted, and its ab-
sence posed questions as to quality and efficiency of the restoration
task. But this cooperative-private partnership resulted in meeting of
forest restoration targets as well as generation of income for the local
community.191
Even though the contract is legally enforceable, sustainable in-
come of COOPLANTAR was solely dependent upon a single
contractual project.192 The price negotiated under the forest contract
was not sufficient to fulfill all the operational requirements, and this
resulted in non-conformity to the Forest Stewardship Certification
(FSC) Standards. Other shortcomings identified were the lack of confi-
dence in the cooperative members and lack of qualified personnel to
carry out administrative work. However, it is debatable that the ab-
sence of the state in the overall supervision and assistance in the
management of incentive-driven collaboration, like in India, could help
protect the rights of both parties.
190. Id. at 202.
191. Id. at 203.
192. Id. at 204.
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The cooperative leaders now participate in the Brazilian Forest
Dialogue forum to voice their community’s viewpoint while getting
hired by more companies for reforestation projects to connect frag-
mented forest areas.193 This constantly evolving PFM regime has
provided a stable source of income for the community members on com-
paring with the uncertain and legally questionable model of JFM in
India.
Programa Bolsa Floresta (PBF), or the Forest Conservation
Grant Fund, on the other hand, is a state-level, reward-based scheme
to encourage the participation of indigenous communities to avoid de-
forestation in the reserved forest area of 17,000,000 ha.194 The
program is institutionalized jointly by the state policy on climate
change195 and the state System for Protected Area which created
Fundac¸a˜o Amazonas Sustenta´vel (FAS or Amazonas Sustainable
Foundation)196  and the PBF fund with the contribution from Amazo-
nas government and Bradesco (Private Bank) to financially
compensate the indigenous communities and associations which par-
ticipate in the scheme as forest stewards.197 The key objective of the
program is to promote forest conservation, reduce poverty, and miti-
gate climate change in the “deep Amazon.”198 The families or
associations have to undergo a two day training program on sustaina-
ble land use management and must make a “zero deforestation
commitment” to be eligible for the grant program and receive up to
4000 Reais (2500 U.S. dollars) per year to incentivize their sustainable
forest management initiatives.199
PBF emphasizes the enhancement of livelihood opportunities
and gender inclusion, as compensation given to families is paid to fe-
193. Id. at 205.
194. The Forest Conservation Grant Fund (Bolsa Floresta), FOREST CARBON PORTAL,
http://www.forestcarbonportal.com/project/forest-conservation-grant-fund-bolsa-floresta
(last visited Sept. 5, 2013).
195. Lei No. 3.135, de 5 Junho 2007, DIA´RIO OFICIAL DA ESTADO DO AMAZONAS
[D.O.E.A.], de 05.06.2007 (Braz.), available at http://www.sefaz.am.gov.br/Areas/OpcaoSiste
mas/SILT/Normas/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Estadual/Lei%20Estadual/Ano%202007/Arquivo/
LE%203135%2007.htm.
196. Virgilio M. Vı´ana, Bolsa Floresta (Forest Conservation Allowance): An Innovative
Mechanism to Promote Health in Traditional Communities in the Amazon, 22 ESTUDOS
AVANC¸ADOS 143, 145 (2008), available at http://www.scielo.br/pdf/ea/v22n64/en_a09v2264
.pdf.
197. See FOREST CARBON PORTAL, supra note 194.
198. See Vı´ana, supra note 196, at 150.
199. See FOREST CARBON PORTAL, supra note 194.
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male members of the indigenous communities.200 The community or
the family could also be penalized if they cause deforestation beyond
allowable limits.201 This enforcement is possible because PBF’s basis is
an agreement entered between FAS and indigenous population as for-
est guards, clearly defining the commitments of both parties.202 The
current obstacles to the efficient implementation of the program are
the low level of incentives, uncertain contract duration, and the low
threshold for performance-based payment.203 Another challenge in this
participatory approach is that of “coordination flaws” between many
institutions involved, which is a recurrent theme in all environmental
management programs in Latin America.204 It may add to confidence
of communities if the scheme offers a redress mechanism in case griev-
ances against insufficient payments.
The Rural Property Environmental Licensing System (SLAPR)
was a licensing program initiated by the environmental agency of the
state of Mato Grosso for tracing illegal forest clearing activities in spe-
cific rural regions through satellite data.205 SLAPR disclosed large
illegal clearings in the state and resulted in a drastically reduced rate
of deforestation in 2000. This licensing program’s model can be used to
license native forest management projects. A permit can be issued to
native communities to exercise their traditional forest rights within
the prescribed limits and stipulations for a specific period of time
under general monitoring by state agencies. This permit is similar to
India’s community resource rights certificate or patta or nistar patrak
issued to indigenous communities under FRA206 which confers rights
of ownership and access to collect, use, and dispose of NTFPs tradition-
ally collected within or outside the village boundary.
C. Role of Judiciary and Access to Justice
It is noteworthy that such participatory schemes based on
REDD+ commitments that aim to sequester carbon and contribute to
200. Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., Reducing Forest Emissions in the Amazon Basin:
A Review of Drivers of Land-use Change and How Payments for Environmental Services
(PES) Schemes Can Affect Them 11-13 (CIFOR, Working Paper No. 40, 2008), available at
http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/WPapers/WP40Wertz-Kanounnikoff.pdf.
201. Id. at 11.
202. See Vı´ana, supra note 196.
203. See Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., supra note 200, at 11.
204. See Vı´ana, supra note 196 (citing ONU. Comissa˜o Econoˆmica para a Ame´rica
Latina e o Caribe. Santiago: Cepal, 2007 ECLAC 2007).
205. See McAllister, supra note 169, at 10877.
206. F.R.A. § 3(1)(b).
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rural livelihoods, strongly depend on robust functioning of government
institutions, accountability tools, and effective law enforcement.207
Forest governance in Brazil has been feeble, and thus, 80% of defores-
tation in the Brazilian Amazon is found to be illegal. In such
circumstances the accountability tools available to oversight actors like
IBAMA and civil societies can check the ineffective implementation of
the law or the unsustainable management of forest lands through
timely judicial action.208 Crucial measures to strengthen the institu-
tional capacity for effective implementation and policing through
sufficient manpower, vehicles, mapping, and tracking systems209 like
permits or tools like Global Forest Watch need to be supported by en-
forcement through impartial specialized tribunals and the judicial
system.
The Brazilian Constitution authorizes Ministerio P’blico (Public
Prosecutor) at both federal and state level to engage themselves in civil
actions “to protect public and social property, the environment and . . .
collective interests.”210 Since they are independent of any of the gov-
ernment branches, they have filled a significant gap in the
enforcement of environmental law against government agencies and
private parties.211 On the other hand, Superior Tribunal De Justic¸a
(High Court of Brazil, STJ) was constituted by the 1988 Brazilian Con-
stitution to assist Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court,
STF) in reaching expeditious and effective judicial resolutions. Brazil’s
Public Civil Action Act of 1985, though not limited to environmental
matters, provides a cause of action for the public prosecutor and Civil
Society Environmental Organizations to sue for injunctive relief and
damages in case of any violation of environmental right ensured under
the existing laws.212 This enables both public and prosecutors to com-
pel the private parties and government to comply with existing
environmental laws and other commitments made under the PFM
regime.
207. FLORENCE DAVIET, USING ACCOUNTABILITY: WHY REDD+ NEEDS TO BE MORE THAN
AN ECONOMIC INCENTIVE 2 (2014), available at http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/
WRI14_IssueBrief_REDD.pdf.
208. Id. at 6.
209. See Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., supra note 200, at 17.
210. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1988, art. 129 (Braz.).
211. Bryner, supra note 145, at 470.
212. Id. (citing Law No. 7.347, 24 July 1985 (Braz.)).
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM: EXCHANGE OF FAVORABLE PRACTICES
Implementation of forest management laws and plans is loca-
tion-specific and varies not only between nations but also within
nations. Due to such regionally entrenched practices of forest manage-
ment, it is difficult to replicate the practices from another country.
Having explored the PFM regimes in India and Brazil within their re-
spective environmental governance systems, there are few common
features that have been identified that allow the exchange of legal and
implementation ideas. India and Brazil share not only the common his-
tory of forest resource exploitation and feeble procedural rights
framework under the state rule, but also continue to face the increas-
ing threat of extinction of many indigenous and traditional
communities due to forest resource depletion. This part of the paper
attempts to learn lessons from the PFM regimes of both the countries.
Using the best PFM practices of one country to remedy the shortcom-
ing of another, the objective of forest conservation and sustainable use
of forest resources can be achieved without undue exclusion of the in-
digenous and traditional communities.
India’s JFM is a robust and sustainable PFM regime which uses
an incentive-driven approach to forest conservation and economic de-
velopment of the forest-fringe communities. It has been successful in
creating communities as forest custodians by identifying their forest
rights and encouraging public participation in forest-related decision
making processes. Thus, it progressively attempts to incorporate the
Principle 10 and 13 of the Stockholm Declaration on ground. The com-
pliance rate with forestry laws is on the positive side as JFM focuses on
forest expansion to promote holistic management of forest tracts by in-
clusion of forest-dependent communities. This has been possible due to
a gamut of exemplary laws on Forest Rights and village-level self-gov-
ernance laws like Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas Act
(PESA).
In contrast, the Brazilian forest management regime is “cha-
otic.”213 There are many reasons that contribute to noncompliance with
the Forest Code at the legislative and administrative levels. Brazil’s
incentive-based participatory approach has potential to mitigate the
noncompliance to great extent by supporting the pro-economic interest
stance of the government. Their focus on the income-generation ap-
proach needs to be supplemented with the respect and dignity of
identity for the indigenous communities. Accordingly, it can be rede-
213. See Hirakuri, supra note 168, at 78.
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signed to offer benefit-sharing as well as government-supported
capacity-building to the Amazonian indigenous communities and the
private landholders for complying with the forestry laws. IBAMA can
play a significant role of bridging the communication between the for-
est-dependent communities and the private developers by introducing
a procedural requirement for notification and consultation with the
concerned communities.
While the system in India is functioning better than that of Bra-
zil, improvement could be made to participatory forest governance
systems in India. A firm legal basis needs to be provided to JFM by
including it in a revised version of the Indian Forest Act of 1927 (Sec-
tion 28 in particular), while States can use State Forest Acts for
institutionalizing the JFM regime. In Brazil, the constitutional man-
date under Art. 225 can be used to modify Public Forest Management
Law and Forest Code to recognize PFM approaches.
The legality of JFMCs and VFCs as constitutional bodies needs
to be firmly established by an act of Parliament. Instead of the Society
Registration Act, like Brazil’s COOPLANTAR, they can be constituted
under Cooperation Societies Act to ensure maximum benefit to the
communities. The present system which favors the forest department
over JFMCs needs to be balanced so that both the stakeholders can be
equal partners involved in JFM activities. To add to this, the land ten-
ure rights over forest area or resources must be secured for the
stakeholders for incentivizing the PFM regime in perpetuity.214 In Bra-
zil, private and rural landowners have the capacity to commit and
participate in PFM regime since they own the stakes in the forest area.
In India, legislation like FRA and PESA attempt to mainstream the
land tenure rights of forest dwellers and indigenous communities.
In Brazil, an enhanced State’s role in the supervision of the
PFM activities can ensure equitable negotiation of terms of the con-
tract between communities and private landholders. Government’s role
in PFM may vary as per the nature and design of the regime. They can
ensure compatibility of the regime with existing governmental law and
policy in a given area (for instance, Tribal reserves in India) and may
obligate the stakeholder to participate in the regime. State may act as
a “broker,” buyer, or seller of the forest products in this forest-trading
regime.215
214. ROWENA MAGUIRE, GLOBAL FOREST GOVERNANCE: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND POLICY
TRENDS 246-7 (2013).
215. Id. at 245-6.
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There is a strong need for a mechanism to redress complaints
arising out of PFM related disputes. Utmost importance must be given
to protection of rights of village and indigenous communities.  Environ-
mental Courts and Tribunals can play a significant role in enforcing
the traditional rights as well as procedural rights in market-based re-
gimes. Judicial protection to environment and rights of communities
can be successful through judicial capacity-building.
Tax incentives and credits must be diverted towards private or
voluntary projects that increase economic efficiency and sustainability
of already deforested areas.216 The role of the private actor is crucial to
make payments for improved forest services in developing countries.
The private actors can be engaged by innovative use of Forest Steward-
ship Certification or under the Corporate Social Responsibility tool.217
The ambiguity between the concurring roles of PRIs and JFM
related bodies like FPCs and JFMCs should be resolved in India. Also,
there is a need to synergize the functions of Gram Sabha and JFMCs
under FRA and JFM regime in a given forest area.
There is a dire need for introduction of new technologies of silvi-
culture like forest restoration techniques, seed collection, and using
GIS for monitoring. Like in Brazil, JFMCs and indigenous communi-
ties can be trained to use digital technology for monitoring
deforestation activities. Complementary training needs to be provided
to village communities on reforestation and forest management with
special emphasis on gender inclusion. More steps need to be taken to
ensure equal representation of women in community meetings and
other PFM related activities like consultation, planning, mapping, and
rule-making. Women of the forest communities collect and extract for-
est resources for various uses, and their traditional knowledge of the
species can be preserved by keeping them at the forefront of forest
stewardship.
Implementation can be ensured through bodies responsible for
monitoring and evaluation, like the National Institute for Space Re-
search (INPE) and the Project Monitoring Deforestation in the Amazon
(PRODES), which conducts monthly surveys and monitors deforesta-
tion respectively for dissemination of data, supports surveillance, and
assists ministry for taking new measures and action plans for control-
ling deforestation.218
216. See generally AMAZON FUND, ACTIVITY REPORT 2011: BASIC CONCEPTS (2011),
available at http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/FundoAmazonia/export/sites/default/site_en/
Galerias/Arquivos/Relatorio_Atividades/RAFA_2011_INGLES_CADERNO_1.pdf.
217. See MAGUIRE, supra note 186, at 244-5.
218. See AMAZON FUND, supra note 216.
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There is a need to establish a National Forest Information Sys-
tem (NAFIS) where the forestry information can be collated from all
jurisdictions—state, district, and Panchayat level—and independent
forest management agencies in a uniform format for the public to ac-
cess.219 This will be an effective tool for good forest governance,
especially in a market-based regime like JFM. It will ensure accounta-
bility, transparency, and public participation by providing information
on goals, timelines, formation, and practical operation of the regime,
reports on the forest trade, and information about investment and
benefits.
Both countries need to incorporate agrarian planning as part of
their functions under PFM regimes, which is the major cause for defor-
estation in rural regions. Procedural requirements as to consultation
and decision-making in the implementation of urban sustainable in-
frastructural projects must be ensured by the State.
Above all, steps should be taken to enhance employment and
income generation opportunities in the restoration of degraded and
abandoned forest lands. This practice has the incidental benefit of en-
couraging changes in management and use of forest resources by the
local communities.220
CONCLUSION
For proper governance of forests under international commit-
ments, it is important to have a clear understanding of what is meant
by “forest” and “sustainable forest management.” The notion of sus-
tainable forest management is an adaptive international concept,
which applies to all forest ecosystems, whether in developed or devel-
oping countries, to meet global targets.221
The term “forest” is a relative term for every community, under-
stood differently depending on local topography. In an international
context, forest refers to areas with substantial tree cover in “any given
geographical range and with any species structure.”222
Sustainable forest management is certainly a contentious con-
cept, especially in the wake of a transitioning ecological and economic
understanding of the world. Historically, forest management has been
a cause of friction between the dominant authority and the dominated
219. S.P.S. Kushwaha, Remote Sensing and GIS for Forest Management, ENVIRONEWS
(Oct. 2012), http://isebindia.com/09-12/12-10-01.html.
220. F.R.A. § 2(a).
221. See AMAZON FUND, supra note 216, at 4.
222. See id.
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public, with both asserting their absolute rights over the forest re-
sources. Since the Rio Earth Summit, it has been a subject of global
concern, yet still failing to generate a worldwide formal agreement. In-
stead of resulting in international collaborations, it has created a
political and economic divide between developing and developed
countries.
PFM is a sub-concept under the wider umbrella of SFM regime.
It has the potential to eliminate socio-political conflict regarding re-
source management and the sustainable use of forests. Agenda 21223
advocates the rights indigenous communities have on their lands and
foresees their financial growth capacity eventually resulting in an ef-
fective forest stewardship.224 This can go a long way in building
sustainable forest ecosystems in developing countries in spite of the
global demand for forest products. However, according to the U.N. De-
partment for Economic and Social Affairs, recognition of the
indigenous rights over forests has been a relatively ignored subject
globally while communities continue to press governments for legal
recognition of their traditional land rights.225 It is important to develop
location-specific and community-specific PFM regimes to meet the
needs of locals.226 Any development project in the forests must involve
proper consultation process with locals and attain their “free, prior and
informed consent” before proceeding.227 Steps should be taken to incor-
porate the traditional knowledge of the communities especially in the
demarcation of PFM area and developing suitable harvesting prac-
tices.228 Tribes have proved to be effective in monitoring illegal logging
activity in and around their traditional forest land. For example,
Google is helping the Paiter-Surui tribe in Brazil to use Google Earth
to monitor and map the forests for sustainable management.229
From the analysis of the PFM regimes in India and Brazil, it is
evident that transparency and accountability play a significant role in
the effective collaborative implementation of tasks between communi-
ties and the government. India is ranked 94th out of 174 countries in
223. See Earth Summit, supra note 2, at Principle 22.
224. See Moran, supra note 173, at 405.
225. Indigenous Activist Fights to Save his Tribe and the Amazon Rainforest, UN NEWS
CENTRE  (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44666#.VQsFRYr
3anN.
226. See Evolution of Forest Policies, supra note 63, at 9.
227. See UN NEWS CENTRE, supra note 225.
228. See Evolution of Forest Policies, supra note 63, at 9 (citing DEEP NARAYAN PANDEY,
BEYOND VANISHING WOODS: PARTICIPATORY SURVIVAL OPTIONS FOR WILDLIFE, FORESTS, AND
PEOPLE (1996)).
229. See UN NEWS CENTRE, supra note 225.
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the corruption perception index (CPI) 2012, and their corruption per-
ception index score of 36 (the lower the score, the higher the
corruption) indicates it as a major contributor to the economic and so-
cial growth impediment.230 Brazil, on the other hand, is ranked 69th
with a CPI score of 43. The index clearly reveals that both the coun-
tries are suffering from serious corruption problems which translate
directly in the forestry sector.
A national monitoring and evaluation body should be assigned
the task of evaluating the progress of community based forestry pro-
grams.  The information on challenges faced and successful
implementation stories may be shared through a clearinghouse mecha-
nism using the MoEF website. The forest fringe communities should be
involved in the monitoring and planning processes. Their presence in
the planning, development, and adoption of management and extrac-
tion practices can make adapting to new practices less contentious if
they are themselves monitoring the results. For the success of such a
local, adaptive participatory forest management approach, a simplified
set of indicators must be developed for communities.231
Additionally, it is highly recommended to support PFM regime
with a robust legal instrument like an enabling forest conservation act.
The institutions established under the regime must have clear roles
and responsibilities. Having coherent administrative procedures is a
good way to avoid misuse of power while preventing institutions or offi-
cials from reneging on their duties. Such procedures should lay down
the consequences for nonperformance of duties, thereby giving the re-
gime some teeth.  The success of PFM largely depends upon the active
interest of the local community in the welfare of their forests. Thus, it
is pertinent for the forest department to take necessary steps to keep
the community well-informed and involve them in all planning and
management decisions.
The use of market based incentives is a promising strategy to
encourage better protection of forests. Even though sustenance of for-
ests is crucial to communities, the short term gains from exploitation
may create a barrier in the afforestation goals of a developing country.
Financial incentives in the form of baseline rewards, for communities
acting as custodian of the forests, would ward off the scope for such
short-lived monetary benefits.
230. Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency
.org/cpi2012/results (last visited Sept. 5, 2014).
231. See Evolution of Forest Policies, supra note 63, at 9.
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Lastly, PFM is a contractual agreement which enables the shift
of authority from the government into the hands of the communities,
households, and individuals. It does so by institutionalizing the collab-
orated efforts of people, as well as guidance by the governmental
departments. The role of the judiciary as the final arbiter of justice
when there is an institutional or procedural default is equally relevant
to such collaborations. It can lend seriousness of efforts to the PFM
regime, which gets diluted in the micro-managing of large portions of
forests.
In the end, the PFM mechanism signifies a different tool for dif-
ferent people in different locations. In the words of Jeffery Campbell:
Forester may view JFM primarily as a means to ensure forest re-
generation; community members may see it as . . . a means to
ensure daily requirements of food, fodder and NTFPs, and/or a way
to increase incomes; NGO workers/activists may view the program
as a vehicle for grass roots empowerment; [for] academic researcher
. . . an experiment in collective action; while politicians may view
JFM as a means to decentralize control over resources. It is a dy-
namic initiative still very much in its evolutionary stage . . . .”232
232. See Upadhyay, supra note 68, at 2 (quoting Jeffrey Y. Campbell, Second
Generation Issues in JFM: Introduction to Panel Presentation (May 14, 1996)).
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